Iran Between Two Tracks: Indirect Talks in New York and Escalation in Hormuz and the Economic Domain
Bottom line
The key takeaway is that Iran and the United States are simultaneously managing an indirect negotiating track and a track of calibrated escalation, and that the fundamental obstacle is not the absence of a communication channel but the sequencing of concessions: Washington rejects any insufficient initial Iranian step and considers economic pressure more effective, while Tehran refuses to concede before sanctions relief and uses its control over Hormuz as a bargaining chip and a narrative of domestic victory. This structural deadlock leaves the coming period exposed to continued tension and a prolonged economic blockade, with a principal risk being a security incident in or beyond Hormuz that could push escalation beyond intended control.
Current situation
Since the United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York, indirect talks between Washington and Tehran have continued through Qatari and Pakistani mediation, described by a U.S. official as "positive and constructive," with Qatar's Prime Minister citing progress and a desire on both sides to move toward a positive outcome. The Iranian side submitted a new proposal through the mediators, which President Masoud Pezeshkian said is backed by the Supreme Leader, expressing readiness to lower the enrichment level of uranium and denying any pursuit of a nuclear weapon, while stressing a loss of trust due to repeated sanctions and attacks. In contrast, President Donald Trump announced his rejection of the Iranian proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for lifting the naval blockade; Washington said Iran's prior demands (lifting sanctions and releasing billions in frozen assets) caused the rejection, with the White House affirming it is "in no hurry." On the ground, the IRGC Navy announced the seizure of an American autonomous underwater vehicle in the Strait of Hormuz and accused it of espionage, while Iranian naval commanders threatened to target U.S. ships and destroyers even in the Indian Ocean; the Iranian army announced readiness to confront a possible new U.S. attack. In Britain, five suspects were arrested over an alleged plot to target Fairford base, used by U.S. forces, with alert levels raised, though London did not announce any Iranian link. Economically, the U.S. pressure campaign on aviation, banking and trade is expanding, with Oman, the UAE, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia responding with measures restricting Mahan Air, Bank Melli and Bank Mellat, and a U.S. request to London not to renew Bank Melli's license.
Analysis
The reports reflect an Iranian management of two parallel tracks: indirect negotiations aimed at lifting sanctions and averting a military strike, and calibrated ground escalation in the Strait of Hormuz used as leverage and to cement a narrative of domestic victory. The apparent contradiction between Pezeshkian's talk of readiness to lower enrichment and the army's readiness to confront an attack, and the National Security Council's denial of any intention to respond militarily to aviation restrictions, suggests a desire to keep the military option as a bargaining tool rather than an immediate choice, and points to internal debate over the limits of escalation. On the American side, Washington refuses prior concessions and considers time to be on its side, investing in economic siege rather than a deal on Iranian terms, which explains the expansion of pressure on aviation and banking through neighboring states, aimed at forcing regional partners to choose between dealing with Tehran or facing sanctions. Intersecting with this are security and intelligence dimensions outside Iran: the Fairford base incident, reports of Chinese intelligence support for Tehran, and an investigation into an Iran-linked account network active in the Israeli electoral debate—all elements that raise the cost of negotiation and feed mutual suspicion. In the background, multiple mediators (Qatar, Pakistan) and international initiatives (a French draft resolution on freedom of navigation, a Russian Gulf initiative) reflect the transformation of the Hormuz file into an international rather than purely bilateral issue, which Tehran exploits to widen its room for maneuver, while Gulf states and Saudi Arabia reaffirm their security concerns over Iranian conduct.
Outlook
Based on the available data, three possibilities stand out for the coming period. First: continued indirect talks through Qatar and Pakistan moving toward partial understandings or limited de-escalation, while the core knot (full sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear concessions and Hormuz arrangements) remains unresolved, especially given U.S. signals of no urgency. Second: continued "managed escalation" in the Strait of Hormuz through incidents such as the seizure of vehicles or detention of vessels and mutual threats, with an Iranian balancing act that avoids a military response to aviation restrictions and settles for non-military options, accompanied by mounting economic pressure on aviation and banking. Third: a qualitative escalation if Washington chooses, as reported of Trump's inclination, to carry out airstrikes after the elections along with tightening the blockade—a scenario contingent on the negotiation track and on any major security incident, such as the Fairford base case or an attack on ships, which could narrow the margin for containing escalation. International diplomatic activity on freedom of navigation in Hormuz is also likely to continue, complicating Iran's legal and political position.