Israel in Election Season: Netanyahu’s Diplomacy, Turkey Tensions, and Open Security Challenges
Bottom line
In conclusion, Israel is in an electoral transition phase governed by the calculations of October 27, where Netanyahu uses diplomatic and security files in the campaign, while fateful decisions on Gaza, settlement, and the internal investigation are postponed. But this postponement does not halt security risks on the fronts, especially in Gaza, on the northern front, and in the confrontation with Turkey and Iran, making the coming period a mix of partial political stagnation and continued security attrition.
Current situation
News over the past 72 hours shows Israel in a sharp election atmosphere ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for October 27, with heightened diplomatic and security activity by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He made a secret visit to Abu Dhabi to meet Mohammed bin Zayed, delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly that saw delegations withdraw, and directed the preparation of a legal file against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after a Turkish move via Interpol. In contrast, leaders of the 'Change Camp' met at Yair Lapid's home and issued a joint statement to work on forming a government after the elections. On security, the army announced the assassination of a Hamas military wing commander in northern Gaza, two soldiers were killed in Gaza and an investigation team was formed, with alert levels raised on the fronts and reinforcements for Sukkot. The submission of bids for the controversial 'E1' settlement project was postponed until after the elections, and statements by ministers continued regarding Gaza, its annexation, and rejection of a reconstruction plan.
Analysis
The upcoming elections appear to be the dominant framework shaping the behavior of the Israeli government in this period. Netanyahu is using diplomatic and security files in the campaign: the secret visit to Abu Dhabi, meetings with Latin American leaders, an attempt to meet Trump's envoys, and his UN speech, which, according to the report, was directed at both Israeli and American audiences. At the same time, directing the preparation of a legal file against Erdogan comes in response to a Turkish move via Interpol, reflecting the conversion of the dispute with Turkey into an electoral and security card, especially with reports that Israeli intelligence is focusing on the Turkish 'Libya corridor' and calls to confront the 'Eighth Front' funded by Qatar and Turkey. In contrast, the Change Camp is trying to present a unified alternative through the meeting of Lapid, Eisenkot, Bennett, Lieberman, and Golan, but issues such as the participation of Arab parties and the 'Joint List' reveal the limits of this alignment. On security, operations continue in Gaza despite talk of a ceasefire that the army describes as being violated by Hamas, with assassinations and casualties, while air defense gaps against Hezbollah drones and the cost of interceptions are highlighted. Statements about annexing Gaza and rejecting the 'Peace Council' plan show that disagreement within the coalition over the Strip's future is partly postponed because of the elections, and the postponement of the 'E1' tender reflects the electoral sensitivity of settlement. Regionally, Iran's nuclear file and naval armament intersect with fears of multiple fronts, while the peace file with Syria remains distant according to published assessments.
Outlook
Until the election date on October 27, the government is likely to continue focusing on security and diplomatic messages directed at voters, while postponing sensitive decisions such as the 'E1' project and avoiding steps that could be used in electoral propaganda. Continued alert and security preparations are also likely, especially in Gaza and on the northern front, with possible limited responses to any threats. On the Turkish track, legal and diplomatic escalation may continue, but the Turkish message speaking of 'those who want to set us against each other' could open space for de-escalation if Ankara and Tel Aviv adopt reciprocal steps. After the elections, the direction of policy toward Gaza, settlement, and the October 7 investigation file will depend on the composition of the next coalition; a government led by Netanyahu with the right may push toward tougher steps in Gaza and settlement, while a government led by the Change Camp will be constrained by the existing security doctrine and coalition balances. The most prominent risk remains the possible erosion of the Gaza ceasefire, renewed confrontation with Hezbollah or Iran, alongside continued domestic pressure over the investigation committee and conscription.