Situation assessment

Iran is in an open war with the United States since February, where the military confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz intersects with a US naval blockade and accelerating economic pressure. While US President Donald Trump reiterates that Tehran is "collapsing greatly" and that victory is near, pointing to near-complete control of Hormuz and 4,500 Iranian casualties, the IRGC continues to claim it holds the Strait and to have captured US submarines, amid reports that 8 US Marines were injured by an Iranian cruise missile on September 14. In parallel, Qatari mediation has yielded no breakthrough, as Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi received the US response to the Qatari proposal without details being disclosed, while reports suggest Trump may order wide-scale combat operations after the midterm elections. Economically, the rial has plunged past 2.5 million to the dollar, Washington imposed new sanctions on 10 individuals and entities, and there is talk of Iran's last oil shipments to China nearing exhaustion. Domestically, Tehran is mobilizing thousands of volunteers near Hormuz and threatening to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while speaking of US-Israeli attempts to stoke internal divisions.

The news reflects a multi-layered confrontation managed by Tehran and Washington through mutual pressure. Militarily, the Strait of Hormuz appears as a main arena for a battle of both narratives and facts: the IRGC builds deterrence legitimacy through declarations of control and captures, while US Central Command denies this and confirms the rerouting of 122 vessels under its "Iron Wall" blockade, making the Strait a strategic file with both economic and military dimensions. Iran's announcement of an updated list of banned vessels (81 ships, most Gulf-owned) added a regional dimension that widens the confrontation to include Gulf states, and aligns with Tehran's warning over the Israeli prime minister's visit to Abu Dhabi. Diplomatically, Qatari mediation appears the most active channel, but its failure stems from both sides clinging to their demands: lifting the naval blockade in exchange for nuclear concessions, prompting US officials to leak that a return to wide-scale strikes is on the table after the midterms. On the nuclear file, Tehran escalated its rhetoric by threatening to withdraw from the NPT, while the Kremlin expressed concern and sought clarification, indicating Moscow is trying to keep Iran within the international nuclear framework. Economically, indicators of collapse (the rial, sanctions, near-exhaustion of exports) push Tehran toward risk, as it believes it cannot accept a situation where it cannot trade while the Strait is used by foreign powers. Domestically, Iranian leaders work on a discourse of external confrontation and divisions, amid signs of fracture within the conservative camp (the imprisonment of MP Rasaei), adding to the pressures of war.

Based on the data, three scenarios appear likely for the coming period. First: continued diplomatic deadlock with limited-scale military escalation in Hormuz, with the wide option postponed until after the US midterm elections, as US officials' leaks suggest. Second: the failure of Qatari mediation and a shift to a more intense phase of confrontation, especially if Iran acts on its threat to withdraw from the NPT or expands Houthi activity in the Red Sea, or if it carries out threats against US interests in the region within the context of mutual accusations over the Fairford base plot. Third: a partial negotiating breakthrough if Tehran offers concrete steps on the nuclear file in the coming two months, which Washington appears to have set as a test through Vance's statements on "actions not words." In all cases, economic pressure and internal explosion remain factors that could push Tehran either toward painful concessions or toward a military gamble to export the crisis.