Situation assessment

Over the past 72 hours, the region has witnessed multi-front escalation centered on an American-Israeli war on Iran that has entered its eighth month. The naval force of the IRGC announced the targeting of a third giant oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz within two days, with six attacks on commercial vessels recorded in a single day and a tanker hitting a naval mine and being attacked by a drone near Sohar in Oman, resulting in the loss of two Indian sailors. In parallel, a specialized report revealed that the American blockade halted Iranian crude oil exports in October, after they had fallen to zero in the second week of September. In contrast, the United States, Britain, and 27 other parties issued a collective warning to Iran following the Fairford base incident, while Trump and Netanyahu exchanged statements about targeting leaderships and toppling the regime. On other fronts, Israel continued its airstrikes, artillery shelling, and incursions in southern Lebanon (Al-Khiam, Al-Jarmaq, Al-Mansouri, Zawtar) and in the Quneitra and Daraa countryside in southern Syria, where it detains citizens and shepherds, and launched strikes on Gaza that killed people in Khan Younis and the Al-Tuffah neighborhood. Meanwhile, diplomacy is moving through a Qatari delegation led by the Prime Minister to Beirut, the European Union's establishment of a support mission in Lebanon as UNIFIL's mandate nears its end, and American preparations for a field survey in Gaza to determine locations for the handover of Hamas weapons under Trump's 20-point plan. All of this is unfolding against the backdrop of an Israeli electoral deadline set for October 27, 2026.

The developments across the five states are linked by a single organizing thread: the Iranian file, which acts as the axis from which the other crises flow and to which they connect. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the halt of Iranian oil exports, and the price of a barrel exceeding $100 no longer remained an Iranian-American affair; they extended to Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities and to Trump's recent threats, which were explicitly tied to the upcoming American elections. In this context, the Lebanese President's call with the Saudi Crown Prince following the attacks on Riyadh, and Hamas's participation in mediation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, indicate that the region's states are now linking their internal security to the course of this war. As for the Lebanese front, it is the direct mirror of the Iranian file: Washington declares its commitment to the tripartite framework and to Hezbollah's disarmament; Beirut receives assurances against expanding the security zone in exchange for not providing pretexts; the Lebanese-Israeli military meeting is postponed until after the Knesset elections and the American midterms; and Resolution 2790, which ends UNIFIL's mandate at the end of 2026, with the European Union launching an alternative support-and-training mission, reflects a shift from peacekeeping to conflict and friction management. Internally in Lebanon, international pressures intersect with Hezbollah's announcement of the financial assistance program "Waad wa Iltizam," the continued seizure of explosives shipments coming from Syria, and the government's rejection of the party's attempts to recover the shipment seized at Dahr al-Baidar, amid talk of exclusive state control over weapons and progress on the general amnesty file. On the Palestinian front, Gaza has moved into the post-war phase: Trump's 20-point plan, a field survey to determine weapons handover locations, and an American acknowledgment that reconstruction will take years with "real progress" toward disarmament, against the backdrop of continued Israeli airstrikes and the postponement of Palestinian elections. The October 7 documents reveal that Sinwar concealed the timing of the attack from Hezbollah and Iran, a fact that casts shadows on the cohesion of the "axis of resistance." As for Syria, it has turned into a new arena of competition: repeated Israeli incursions in Quneitra and Daraa and the detention of citizens denounced by the UN envoy, against efforts to build a Syrian army with a defense budget of $4.3 billion (41% of the budget), Israeli fears of growing Turkish influence, a path of American-sponsored security arrangements, and indications of possible economic normalization via Mezzeh Airport. The Israeli internal factor remains the accelerator or brake for all these tracks: Netanyahu speaks of toppling the Iranian regime and of readiness for any scenario before the elections; Katz warns of an Iranian plot for electoral influence; Lapid and Eisenkot accuse the government of exploiting the security file for propaganda purposes; and the army speaks of raising readiness while stating there is no intelligence change that justifies military action in Iran at present.

In the near term, three regional scenarios take shape, essentially linked to the course of the war on Iran and the timing of the Israeli elections on October 27. The first is broad escalation: if a decision is made toward a strike on Iran or a preemptive Iranian response — as reports speak of a Netanyahu-Trump discussion of an attack before the elections and fears of an Iranian preemptive strike — this would open the way for simultaneous escalation on the Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria fronts, with continued disruption of navigation in Hormuz and rising energy costs. The second is management through negotiation: this track would likely postpone confrontation, based on Israel's confirmation that there is no intelligence change justifying immediate action, Iran's adherence to a dual path of diplomatic openness and military readiness, and the "seven-day plan" paper and the awaited Iranian response through mediators, which could open space for arrangements in Lebanon (a security agreement or a humanitarian corridor after any Israeli withdrawal with Qatari-Gulf participation) and in Gaza (progress on disarmament and reconstruction). The third is the continuation of a managed conflict: continued Israeli airstrikes and incursions in southern Lebanon and southern Syria and bombardment of Gaza at low to medium levels, while keeping the Iranian file open and the door shut on post-UNIFIL arrangements in Lebanon and post-Hamas-disarmament arrangements in Gaza. In all cases, the Israeli electoral deadline and the American midterm elections will remain the temporal determinant that delays or accelerates any major decision.