Situation assessment

The region is currently experiencing a state of escalating tension in which three main tracks are intertwined. The first track is the confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, reflected in an Iranian escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on ships, against the backdrop of a US naval blockade and ongoing punitive measures, along with reports of US and Israeli military plans against Iranian sites. The second track is Lebanon, which is undergoing a transitional phase as the end of UNIFIL's mandate on 31 December 2026 approaches, amid European and French-Italian alternative arrangements, and the continuation of Israeli airstrikes, shelling and demolitions in the south, alongside an internal debate over the decision of war and peace after Hezbollah acknowledged that the truck of weapons and explosives belonged to it. The third track is Israel itself, where security preparations for a possible confrontation with Iran or Hezbollah intersect with the electoral milestone set for 27 October, which governs the rhythm of escalation decisions. Added to this is Syria, where the new authorities seek to consolidate their position through the chemical weapons file and Gulf engagement, in the face of repeated Israeli violations in Quneitra and the Daraa countryside and Israeli accusations of supporting armed groups in Sweida. In Palestine, Israeli assassinations continue in Gaza despite the ceasefire, while in the West Bank declared Israeli plans to annex about 80 percent of the territory and cancel the Oslo accords come to the fore, alongside escalating settler attacks.

Developments across these countries are linked through three organizing threads. The first thread is the Iranian-Israeli dyad, which sets the tempo for the rest of the arenas; Israeli reports speak of intensified Iranian pressure on Hezbollah to move to a higher level of escalation, including attempts to abduct soldiers, with a dispute between the two parties over timing that has not yet been settled. Conversely, the Israeli security establishment classifies Iran as the main battlefront and Lebanon as secondary, which explains the continuation of Israeli operations in southern Lebanon in parallel with threats to expand the 'permanent security zone' to include Nabatieh and the Litani. The second thread is the electoral timing factor; Israeli reports indicate that Netanyahu prefers to postpone any attack on Iran until after the Knesset elections on 27 October for fear of security repercussions on the election results, while the Israeli government extends the state of emergency on the home front beyond the elections and affirms its readiness for a broad offensive. It is noteworthy that Israeli discourse also uses the Syrian file in the electoral context, by disclosing a phone call with Syrian President al-Sharaa and strikes on headquarters in Damascus. The third thread is the reshaping of international arrangements in Lebanon and Syria; as UNIFIL's mandate nears its end, European tracks are taking shape to strengthen the capabilities of the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces, and a French-Italian initiative to form a coalition of forces on the ground, without constituting a direct substitute for UNIFIL and without a mandate to disarm Hezbollah or impose an Israeli withdrawal, while Damascus seeks parallel arrangements by engaging with the OPCW and opening up to Riyadh, and denies any channels of communication with Hezbollah. In Gaza, the exposure of the gap between declared war objectives and the continuation of Hamas's control over about 40 percent of the Strip, with President Trump's plan at a dead end, indicates that the Palestinian front remains open to a long attrition. Intersecting with all of this are instruments of economic pressure; from the Lebanese central bank's revocation of the license of Bank Saderat Iran at direct US request, to the expansion of US sanctions on Iranian networks, to a Qatari project to develop electricity in Lebanon, indicating that economic influence has become a parallel arena of confrontation.

Regional scenarios in the coming period range between three possibilities. First: the continuation of a policy of incremental pressure without a broad eruption, such that Israeli operations in southern Lebanon and Gaza remain at a controlled pace, and Iran continues to manage limited escalation in Hormuz, until after the Israeli elections, while awaiting Washington's decision. Second: a slide toward wider escalation if an Iranian or Hezbollah operation occurs that takes developments beyond the control of the electoral timing, especially in light of repeated Israeli warnings of miscalculation, and the possibility of Hezbollah joining any broad campaign and its transformation into a long-term conflict. Third: an interim arrangement in which de-escalation of the fronts is traded for re-engineering the Lebanese situation after UNIFIL through a European mission and a French-Italian initiative, in exchange for continued stalemate in Gaza and the West Bank with the deepening of Israeli plans to annex wide areas and cancel Oslo. In all scenarios, the file of economic siege on Iran and the arrangements of the Syrian arena remain two elements that govern the margin of maneuver.