Situation assessment

As the US-Israeli war enters its seventh month, Iran is facing concentrated military and security escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent corridors. Reports point to attacks on commercial ships and tankers, CENTCOM announcing the destruction of an Iranian vessel that was targeting its naval assets, and the continuation of the US naval blockade on Iran while Washington says the strait remains open. In contrast, Tehran says passage through Hormuz is under strict surveillance, describes it as the first line of defense, and rejects any transit without its permission. Politically, intensive security talks are ongoing between Washington and Tel Aviv, with reports of possible US strike plans, including the use of the MOAB against Iran’s energy infrastructure and nuclear sites, while Trump rules out sending ground troops and keeps the option of striking the Mount Pickaxe site on the table. Economically, Washington speaks of tightening the blockade and imposing new sanctions, while Iranian reports reflect severe economic pressure and reduced oil flow through Hormuz, alongside internal debates over war management and subsidy reform. Regionally, Oman speaks of temporary arrangements regarding navigation in Hormuz linked to US-Iranian talks, and the International Maritime Organization is participating in negotiations to resume navigation.

The news indicates that Iran is using the Strait of Hormuz as a central economic and security pressure card, by altering the pace and type of attacks, raising insurance costs, affecting energy markets, and giving Tehran leverage over Washington ahead of the midterm elections. In response, Washington is relying on a naval blockade and escalating economic sanctions, with additions to the OFAC list and warnings about charity networks and hawala transfers, alongside CENTCOM assurances that the blockade continues and that Iran’s maritime exports and imports are nearly halted. Militarily, there is intensive US-Israeli coordination and reports of strike plans including the MOAB against fortified sites, but Israeli analyses doubt that air strikes can topple the regime or force Tehran into concessions, reflecting a gap between political objectives and available military means. Internally, there is a clear divergence in rhetoric: figures such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf declare readiness for war and reject calculations of economic collapse, while former President Mohammad Khatami calls for sparing the country the dangers of war, and newspapers discuss subsidy reform, reduced oil flow, and sharp forecasts of contraction and inflation. Regionally, Omani and international mediation appears fragile, as Oman describes understandings as temporary and linked to talks, while Tehran stresses that this does not mean a normal reopening of the strait, at a time when previous initiatives produced only short-lived memoranda.

Based on the available data, three main paths can be envisaged. The first is continued limited escalation, naval confrontation, and economic pressure without a full-scale war, alongside mediation attempts to manage navigation in Hormuz. The second is a broader military escalation if Trump decides to carry out a strike on nuclear sites or energy infrastructure, which could push Tehran to retaliate against Israel and countries cooperating with it, and to further restrict navigation in Hormuz, with consequences for energy markets. The third is a diplomatic breakthrough through temporary arrangements mediated by Oman or international actors, but it would remain fragile and linked to the fate of US-Iranian talks. Across all these paths, there are no decisive indications that the war will end soon, despite Trump’s repeated statements that it will end shortly.