Situation assessment

Developments over the past 72 hours show simultaneous movement on two tracks. Politically, amid preparations for coming elections in Israel, a vision is being advanced that calls for imposing Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, cancelling the Oslo Accords, dismantling the Palestinian Authority, and annexing roughly 80% of the open areas and settlements, with local civil administration of Arab cities while security responsibility remains in Israeli hands — countered by warnings of internal disintegration and calls for peace and development. On the ground in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army and Shin Bet announced a series of aerial strikes targeting commanders of Hamas's military wing, including Momen Ahmad Salama al-Ay in Gaza City and Muhammad Khallet in the northern Strip, along with the killing of two individuals in Khan Younis linked to weapons smuggling and the destruction of a roughly 1.5-kilometre underground route in the south. This coincided with the bombing of a building near al-Muttaqin Mosque west of the Yarmouk neighbourhood, a drone strike near a school in the al-Saftawi area that killed one person and wounded others, and a Palestinian injured by Israeli fire in Jabalia. Meanwhile, Hamas marked the second anniversary of Yahya Sinwar's killing, the Israeli army published documents it said were in his handwriting revealing planning details for the 7 October 2023 attack, and Hamas's military wing revealed that one of its commanders had killed an Israeli soldier and held Israeli captives. In the West Bank, settler attacks continue, ranging from targeting the olive harvest to burning cars, while a ramming incident targeted an Israeli citizen in the Atirat area. Diplomatically, Hamas called on envoy Mladenov to stop siding with Israel and to press it to lift the siege on Gaza. Finally, the Shin Bet approved the employment of 3,000 workers from Gaza to build the so-called 'New Rafah', but Hamas is preventing their entry.

Three main drivers intersect in these reports. The first is the Israeli electoral factor: advancing a vision based on annexing about 80% of the West Bank, cancelling Oslo, and dismantling the Palestinian Authority indicates that political discourse at this stage is oriented towards entrenching unilateral facts rather than towards a settlement, and that the competing voice within the Israeli arena focuses more on internal risks than on the consequences for the conflict itself. This vision converges with escalating settler attacks in the West Bank, where official discourse and field practice reinforce the same climate and narrow the space for any political track based on the Authority and a negotiated solution. The second is the structure of the Gaza ceasefire: Israeli statements describe their operations as targeting those who 'violate the ceasefire' and seek to restore capabilities, meaning the agreement is being managed unilaterally through a series of limited, repeated strikes. This places Hamas before a dual dilemma: preserving its organisational capabilities on one hand, and avoiding a broad response that could collapse what remains of the truce and the humanitarian situation on the other. The military wing's disclosure that one of its commanders killed an Israeli soldier and held captives, the commemoration of Sinwar, and the publication of documents attributed to him all fall within a contest of narratives aimed at entrenching internal legitimacy and assigning responsibility for 7 October, rather than being immediate operational data. The third is the struggle over field and humanitarian control in Gaza, most clearly visible in the 'New Rafah' file: the Shin Bet's approval of 3,000 workers and Hamas's blocking of them reveal a direct confrontation over who controls the crossings, the labour force, and the reshaping of civilian geography, turning the humanitarian issue into a tool in that competition. Hamas's warning to Mladenov reflects its conviction that international pressure is insufficient or unbalanced, at a time when Israel continues its operations without a visible deterrent. In the West Bank, the ramming incident in Atirat and the continuation of settler attacks indicate that tension there feeds on political vacuum and expansionist official discourse, with risks of mutual escalation.

Based on available data, the current pattern in Gaza is likely to continue: limited air strikes targeting commanders and capabilities classified as violating the truce, against Hamas restraint that does not rule out narrow field responses or escalation through other channels, with no indications of a return to full-scale confrontation in the near term. The 'New Rafah' track reinforces the likelihood of continued contention over crossings, workers, and aid, with direct repercussions on the humanitarian situation. In the West Bank, the pairing of annexationist political discourse with escalating settler attacks and individual operations is expected to persist, potentially raising the tempo of friction in settlements and on main roads. On the Israeli political level, the fate of the annexation and Oslo-cancellation proposals remains contingent on election results and internal balances, but they already weaken the Palestinian Authority's position and deepen its uncertainty. Diplomatically, Palestinian demands for pressure on Israel are likely to continue without tangible change in the balance of power unless the international position shifts.